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PAYING TOO DEARLY FOR A WHISTLE:
PROPERLY PROTECTING
INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS
Leonardo Labriola*
In light of substantial disagreement among the circuits on which types of
whistleblowers Dodd-Frank intends to protect, and newly proposed
legislation which suggests a solution, this Note inspects Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protections in an effort to better explain which types of
corporate whistleblowers should and should not be protected. This Note
briefly outlines the United States’s repeated history of increased regulation
following financial crises, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank Acts. It then describes the goals that motivated these acts and how
whistleblowers play an outsized role in accomplishing those goals. It also
examines the critical statute for corporate whistleblower protection—DoddFrank’s section 922—and describes the SEC’s interpretation of that text.
This Note then contrasts the competing interpretations of section 922 and
compares the policy results of those interpretations. It also looks at how
existing structures within the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
protections from other related whistleblower regimes might inform DoddFrank’s protections. Finally, this Note proposes a cohesive solution that
protects internal whistleblowers, respects corporate decision making, and
furthers Sarbanes-Oxley’s and Dodd-Frank’s goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Over fifteen years ago, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.1
Enron, once ranked among the “most admired” companies in the world by

1. Michael W. Peregrine, Enron Still Matters, 15 Years After Its Collapse, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/business/dealbook/enronstill-matters-15-years-after-its-collapse.html [https://perma.cc/7YDQ-8XQT].
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Fortune magazine, was an energy giant.2 Mutual funds, private investors,
and Enron employees padded their accounts with Enron stock options as
protections against risk. Then, after years of outperforming the market,3
Enron suddenly filed for bankruptcy. After Enron had fraudulently
misreported its finances for years, the chickens had finally come home to
roost.4 Enron stock, “which peaked at $90 in August 2000,”5 fell to just $0.26
per share by the end of November the following year.6 In just three of those
months, Enron’s stock had fallen from $36 per share to less than $0.50 per
share.7 The company had collapsed. Darvin Mitchell, an Enron employee,
was three years from retiring when he was laid off.8 He had his family’s
retirement savings in Enron stock.9 He was forced to survive on social
security.10 Anne Beliveaux, who worked for eighteen years as an assistant
in Enron’s tax department, was forced to live on $1,600 per month after her
retirement savings were similarly wiped out.11 When Enron’s CEO Jeffery
Skilling was sentenced to 292 months in prison, Dawn Powers Martin took
the opportunity to tell Skilling that she and her daughter would be clipping
grocery coupons despite her twenty-two years working at Enron.12 Ten
thousand similarly situated employees lost their jobs and $1.2 billion in life
savings.13
Fifteen years later, there are still lessons to be learned from Enron.14
Several whistleblowers inside Enron had alerted top management of the
financial reporting violations that Enron was committing.15 Rather than heed
the warnings of those whistleblowers, Enron’s top executives chose instead
to fire them.16 If those whistleblowers had legal recourse for their firing, and

2. Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much
Information, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/
open-secrets-3 [https://perma.cc/PJ3A-DUQ9].
3. See DUANE GRUBERT & DAVID WIDEMAN, ENRON: BRUISED BUT STRONG, UPGRADED
TO OUTPERFORM 3 (2001), http://www.rbcpa.com/enron/ene_sanford_20010921.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2VST-RK7P].
4. Jeffrey Toobin, End Run at Enron, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2003),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/10/27/end-run-at-enron [https://perma.cc/R77G5LE6].
5. 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, CNN MONEY (Nov. 26, 2001, 2:36 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2001/11/26/401k/q_retire_enron_re/ [https://perma.cc/D8HZ-28T3].
6. Enron Corporation (ENRN Q) Common Stock Historical Price Table, GILARDI & CO.
LLC 32, http://www.gilardi.com/pdf/enro13ptable.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/YK47-C6ZV].
7. Id. at 31–32.
8. Analee Bivins, Church Members Not Immune from Enron Woes, CHRISTIAN CHRON.
(Mar. 2002), http://www.christianchronicle.org/article/church-members-not-immune-fromenron-woes [https://perma.cc/4SXL-B79S].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Gladwell, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Toobin, supra note 4.
14. See Peregrine, supra note 1.
15. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
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a federal audience for their claims, perhaps Enron’s collapse might have been
avoided.17
In an attempt to encourage whistleblowing and prevent another such
catastrophe, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank”) sought to protect and reward whistleblowers.18 However, in
Dodd-Frank, Congress created an arguable ambiguity leaving room for courts
to disagree on the extent of this whistleblower protection.19
This Note argues that the solutions to this ambiguity are, so far, inadequate.
Either they fail to adequately protect internal whistleblowers or fail to accord
the proper degree of discretion to corporate compliance regimes. Failing in
the former ignores the pragmatic realities of corporate whistleblowing.
Failing in the latter ignores the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley. Both face
potentially insurmountable interpretive and policy challenges. This Note
recommends a more coherent solution that looks to the extant structures
within and without Dodd-Frank to relieve certain internal whistleblowers of
the burden of proof to show retaliatory action while still requiring that burden
of proof for other internal whistleblowers.
Part I briefly outlines the United States’s repeated history of increased
regulation following financial crises, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank Acts. It then describes the goals that motivated these Acts and
how corporate whistleblowers play an outsized role in accomplishing those
goals. Part II examines the critical statute for corporate whistleblower
protection—Dodd-Frank’s section 922—and describes the SEC’s
interpretation of that text. Next, Part III contrasts the Second and Fifth
Circuits’ competing interpretations of section 922 and compares the policy
results of those interpretations. It also looks at how existing structures within
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the Commission”) and
the protections from other related whistleblower regimes might inform DoddFrank’s protections. Finally, Part IV proposes a cohesive solution that better
protects internal whistleblowers, respects corporate decision making, and
furthers Sarbanes-Oxley’s and Dodd-Frank’s goals.
I. WHISTLEBLOWERS GUARD AGAINST CRISIS
Congress has long met financial crises with increased financial regulation.
Two of the most recent and significant of these regulations are SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank. These two acts, in relevant part, create protections
and rewards for corporate whistleblowers so as to better discover securities
violations and thereby better enforce securities laws.
A. The Repeated History of Financial Crisis
Whistleblower protections and rewards have only recently developed as
congressional solutions to financial crises. However, financial crises are not
17. See infra Part I.C.1.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
19. See infra Part II.B.

2017]

PAYING TOO DEARLY FOR A WHISTLE

2843

new phenomena in American history. Whenever America has been faced
with wide-scale financial crises, Congress has responded by passing broad
legislation that uses the tools of financial regulation to alleviate the crisis and,
purportedly, to prevent any similar future crises.20 This stretches as far back
as the Civil War, which itself could be viewed as the most direct federal-level
labor regulation in American history. Ultimately, the war left the American
South decimated and in rapid economic decline.21 In response, Congress
passed the National Bank Act22 in an effort to centralize and regulate the
American banking system, if not begin in earnest to establish a national
bank.23 After the “Panic of 1907,” which caused a rippling 25 percent loss
in the New York Stock Exchange over the course of just two months,24
Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which created the National
Monetary Commission25 that ultimately established the Federal Reserve
under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.26 The Great Depression that
followed Black Tuesday motivated Congress to create arguably the largest
regulatory regime in American history. This “New Deal” yielded the
Banking Act of 1933,27 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,28 the Social

20. William D. Cohan, Introduction to DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES, at xi (2011)
(paraphrasing Yale economist Arthur Okun as stating that “a rip-roaring financial crisis is
bound to result in a new swath of financial reglation”); Zizi Petkova, Comment, Interpreting
the Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 574 (2016)
(pointing out the “long-standing pattern of remedial Congressional action following major
systemic [economic] failures”).
21. See generally JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF
AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1940, at 378–80 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that
“many have accepted war damage as the primary source of the southern economic decline”).
22. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also 12 U.S.C. § 38; Jonathan L. Levin, In Search of
the National Bank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741, 742–44 (1980).
23. See JAMES ELIOT MASON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1956–1991, at 24 (1997) (calling the National Bank Act of 1863 “the nation’s
first comprehensive effort to establish a national banking system and a unified monetary
system”).
24. Carola Frydman et al., Economic Effects of Runs on Early “Shadow Banks”: Trust
Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907, 123 J. POL. ECON. 902, 917 (2015).
25. Sayre Ellen Dykes, The Establishment and Evolution of the Federal Reserve Board:
1913–23, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 227, 227 (1989); see also J. Laurence Laughlin, The AldrichVreeland Act, 16 J. POL. ECON. 489, 492–93 (1908) (“In the last session of Congress, following
the panic of 1907, the demand for new legislation contained the crude expectation that the law
would prevent the possibility of future panics.”).
26. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing “a more
effective supervision of banking in the United States”); see Dykes, supra note 25, at 227.
27. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and formally separating any national banks and their
state member banks from issuers of securities). Parts of this act are more familiarly known as
“the Glass-Steagall Act.” Cohan, supra note 20, at xii.
28. Ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881–82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (establishing the
SEC).
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Security Act,29 the National Labor Relations Act,30 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.31
However, these historical responses to financial crises served only as the
vanguards for Congress’s more recent actions in similar contemporary crises.
As the economy reeled from the dot-com crash in 2002,32 Enron, MCI
WorldCom, and Tyco, all financial behemoths,33 were discovered to have
committed wide-scale fraud at the executive level,34 causing unrecoverable
drops in thousands of Americans’ mutual and retirement funds, 401(k)s, and,
in some cases, their entire life savings.35 To prevent this institutionalized
fraud from happening again, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley,36 which
29. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 301) (establishing the Social
Security Board).
30. Ch. 372, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151) (establishing the
National Labor Relations Board).
31. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201).
32. Petkova, supra note 20, at 574.
33. Enron was the seventh largest publicly traded company in the United States when it
declared bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS:
INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 70 (2012). MCI WorldCom was
the “second-largest long-distance provider and a major carrier of Internet traffic.” Simon
Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overview; WorldCom Facing Charges of Fraud;
Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/
business/turmoil-worldcom-overview-worldcom-facing-charges-fraud-inquiries-expand.html
[https://perma.cc/FU64-HAGC].
34. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview;
Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersenfires-executive-for-enron-orders.html [https://perma.cc/FN3G-ZUEA]; Simon Romero &
Floyd Norris, New Disclosures from WorldCom May Add to Accounting Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/02/business/new-disclosures-fromworldcom-may-add-to-accounting-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/PB93-JDKY]; Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Tyco Admits Using
Accounting Tricks to Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2002), http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/business/corporate-conduct-overview-tyco-admits-usingaccounting-tricks-inflate-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/5UUV-QN3P]. However, this is not
an exhaustive list of the companies found to have committed wide-scale fraud during this time
or even representative of the types of fraud being committed. See Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN.
L. REV. 915, 924–25 (2003) (naming other companies that contributed to the financial
misfeasance of the Enron era including Qwest Communications, Adelphia Communications,
Global Crossing, AOL-Time Warner, Xerox, Rite Aid, and even the corporation whose CEO
allegedly fed insider information to Martha Stewart).
35. See, e.g., 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, supra note 5; see also Geoffrey Colvin, You’re
on Your Own: That Enron Workers Lost Life Savings Is Just Another Sign That the Short Era
of Economic Security Is Over, FORTUNE (Feb. 4, 2002), http://archive.fortune.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/02/04/317527/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4U26CHV4]; Christopher Ketcham, Enron’s Human Toll: How Employees of the Energy Trader
Got Sucked into Stock Market Euphoria—And Catastrophe, SALON (Jan. 23, 2002),
http://www.salon.com/2002/01/23/enron_toll/ [https://perma.cc/4QRW-2RL3].
36. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL.,
WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES, at xi
(2004) (describing how, when urging Congress to pass Sarbanes-Oxley, Representative Mike
Enzi said, “It had to be earthshaking because we are trying to counteract the tremors from the
volcanic action of the mountaintop being blown off such companies as Enron, WorldCom,
Global Crossing, and others”).
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created institutional incentives for corporations to improve their internal
compliance and reporting mechanisms.37 Then, despite nearly a century of
increasing regulation,38 America experienced the worst economic crisis since
the Great Depression.39 Between October 2007 and October 2009,
unemployment doubled, the S&P 500 lost over half its value, and 45 percent
of the world’s total wealth was destroyed.40 To prevent such a crisis from
happening again, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010.41 Dodd-Frank
includes provisions that overlap with the previous financial reporting
incentives and requirements established by Sarbanes-Oxley.42 Among other
37. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1162 (2014); see also ROBERT G. VAUGHN,
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 152 (2012) (“The whistleblower
provision of [Sarbanes-Oxley] was the most comprehensive private-sector whistleblower law
ever enacted in the United States.”).
38. A notable legislative interruption in the otherwise swelling tide of increased securities
regulation was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, which repealed many
of Glass-Steagall’s protective provisions. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). Some have called into question
the wisdom of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and late twentieth-century financial deregulation more
generally, blaming these models for exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis. See generally
Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put
Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008–2009 American Capital
Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371 (2010).
39. SKEEL, supra note 20, at 1; see also GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR
FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS, at vii (2008)
(describing the 2008 financial crisis as “the worst . . . since the 1930s”). In brief, the 2008
financial crisis was caused when a 2006 slump in the housing market revealed massive
instability among lenders due to wide-scale subprime mortgage lending. Crash Course: The
Origins of the Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://
perma.cc/TG48-UQKV].
The sub-prime lending itself was at least partially incentivized by the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) “continu[ing] to
directly bear credit risk by guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities.” Michael Simkovic,
Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 219 (2013). This
underlying risk came largely as a surprise to lenders because Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s
over-rated triple-A tranches of collateralized debt obligations backed by the pooled subprime
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. See Crash Course: The Origins of the Financial
Crisis, supra. For a comprehensive analysis, see generally Michael S. Barr, The Financial
Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2012).
40. Jeff Vogt, Note, Don’t Tell Your Boss?: Blowing the Whistle on the Fifth Circuit’s
Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for Internal Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank, 67
OKLA. L. REV. 353, 353 (2015).
41. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Henry Klehm III et al., Securities
Enforcement Has Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis
With a Call for Greater International Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead, 13 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 927, 936 (2011) (noting that the 2008 crisis “triggered ambitious legislative reform by
the United States Congress, culminating in the historic [Dodd-Frank Act]”); see also Cohan,
supra note 20, at xiv.
42. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C § 26 (2012) (adopting a definition of “monetary sanctions” in the
context of commodities whistleblower protections that includes monies in a disgorgement fund
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley in 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b)); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)
(integrating Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower reporting protections in section 922); see also
infra Part I.C (discussing the significant ways in which Dodd-Frank builds on, modifies, and
overlaps with Sarbanes-Oxley). Sarbanes-Oxley, crafted in the wake of wide-scale accounting
fraud, sought to improve financial accountability in large public corporations, and by many
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things, it provides extensive protections and rewards for corporate insiders
who “blow the whistle” when they discover corporate securities violations
within their organizations.43
These two acts protect and reward whistleblowers for good reason:
employee tips constitute the single most effective way to expose corporate
fraud, constituting over 40 percent of all cases.44 This method accounts for
more reports than the next three highest methods—managerial review,
internal audit, and accidental discovery—combined.45 From the enforcement
side, only 8.8 percent of reports come from external audit, surveillance or
monitoring, and police notification.46 Put another way, tips from
whistleblowers are thirteen times more effective than all external methods of
exposing possible violations.47 Decentralizing financial enforcement
mechanisms by appropriately protecting and rewarding whistleblowers will
play a crucial role in stopping America’s long historical trend of experiencing
financial crises.48
B. What Is a Whistleblower?
This section provides a broad definition of the term “whistleblower.” This
Note ultimately shows that defining “whistleblower” is more difficult than
one may initially imagine. For general purposes, however, a whistleblower
is any person within an organization who acts to make public some
information related to “possible or actual nontrivial wrongdoing” within that
organization.49 The term’s positive connotations evoke images of an
measures it has been successful in doing so. See Jesse Eisinger, To Envision Dodd-Frank’s
Future, Look to Its Predecessor, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2012), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/to-envision-dodd-franks-future-look-to-its-predecessor/
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley] was a response to an epidemic in corporate accounting fraud that swept
American business in the late 1990s and early 2000s. . . . The [2008] financial crisis included
accounting problems. . . . But at its heart, the financial crisis wasn’t an accounting
scandal. . . . [C]orporate America weathered the worst of the downturn without a series of
major accounting frauds.”) [https://perma.cc/NLY3-CRC4]. Dodd-Frank, on the other hand,
was aimed more directly at the concentrated financial services industry and sought generally
to protect securities investors. Id.
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. This Note uses the term “protection” to refer to a
whistleblower’s legislated right of action against an employer who retaliates against the
whistleblower for making her report. See infra Part II.A.3. This Notes uses the terms “reward”
and “bounty” interchangeably to refer to the monetary award given to a whistleblower when
her report leads to a successful enforcement action against the organization. See infra Part
II.A.2.
44. LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 2.
45. Id. at 3 fig.I.1. Managerial review accounts for 15.4 percent of cases, internal audit
accounts for 13.9 percent of cases, and accidental discovery accounts for 8.3 percent of cases.
Id.
46. Id.
47. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110–11 (2010).
48. See infra Part I.C.
49. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 3–4
(2003). When Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to protect government
whistleblowers’ freedom of speech, the wrongdoing it envisioned was “[illegality], or
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety.” Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
§ 101, 92 Stat. 1111, 1114 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9)(A)–(B)).
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impartial referee calling fouls on the field to stop the action50 or an old-time
London bobby alerting officers and onlookers of a crime in progress.51 For
the purposes of this Note, there are two critically different types of
whistleblowers within an organization: internal whistleblowers (who report
suspected wrongdoing to an authority within the organization) and external
whistleblowers (who report suspected wrongdoing to an enforcement
authority outside the organization).52
C. Why Dodd-Frank Protects Whistleblowers
Dodd-Frank is an ambitious set of reforms, but it did not start from
scratch.53 While Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank were ostensibly aimed at
different targets, they used similar tools to enforce their compliance
mechanisms.54 Both created regulatory regimes to achieve their goals.55
Both relied, in part, on forcing corporate boards of directors to establish
various internal committees.56 And both provide significant incentives for
corporate insiders to blow the whistle on financial malfeasance and securities
law violations.57 However, because Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections proved
insufficient to adequately incentivize whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank added
monetary rewards for whistleblowers when their reports resulted in
successful enforcement actions.58
50. See Alan F. Westin, Introduction: Why Whistleblowing Is on the Rise, in WHISTLE
BLOWING!: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1–2 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1981).
51. See JOHNSON, supra note 49, at 4. Arguably, Ralph Nader coined the term in the 1970s
in an attempt to improve the reputation of insiders who expose scandal. See Naseem Faqihi,
Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After
Discovering a Possible Federal Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3346
(2014); David Bollier, Chapter 4: Let the Information Flow, NADER BLOG (Jan. 5, 2004),
https://blog.nader.org/2004/01/05/chapter-4-let-the-information-flow/ [https://perma.cc/XL6
T-A6LJ]; see also Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing
Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 491
(2012) (describing the way in which policymakers used to refer to whistleblowers only in
negative terms such as “rats” and “snitches”); Geneva Campbell, Comment, Snitch or Savior?:
How the Modern Cultural Acceptance of Pharmaceutical Company Employee External
Whistleblowing Is Reflected in Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
565, 566 & n.4 (2013) (giving a brief and interesting history of the term “snitch”).
52. This Note also describes “simultaneous” reporting, which is a scenario in which a
whistleblower makes both external and internal reports of the same incident. See infra notes
207–11 and accompanying text. This Note does not consider the other common type of
external whistleblower—the whistleblower who reports suspected wrongdoing to the public
through news media or information-leaking organizations.
53. See infra Part I.C.1.
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
55. While Dodd-Frank creates an entire administrative agency (the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012), and Sarbanes-Oxley creates a nonprofit
corporation (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a), both
adopt enforcement responsibilities within their respective acts.
56. Sarbanes-Oxley forced certain corporate boards of directors to establish and
effectively maintain an audit committee. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A). Dodd-Frank forced
certain corporate boards of directors to establish and effectively maintain a compensation
committee. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(a)(1).
57. See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6; 18 U.S.C. § 1514a; infra Part I.C.1–2.
58. See infra Part II.C.3.
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1. Sarbanes-Oxley Set a National Standard
for Corporate Whistleblower Protection
[Sarbanes-Oxley] was a direct response to the financial collapse of two
major multinational corporations, Enron and WorldCom, and a reaction to
the “fraud and greed” that was blamed for these failures. Congress intended
that the law would “play a crucial role in restoring trust in the financial
markets” by ensuring that “corporate fraud and greed” would be “better
detected, prevented and prosecuted.”59

Only after millions of investors and pensioners had lost billions of dollars
did the public learn that employees both at Enron and WorldCom had
previously identified the fraud and were silenced when they tried to report
it.60 During its investigations into the Enron scandal and in passing SarbanesOxley, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that senior Enron Vice
President Sherron Watkins had previously “attempted to report or ‘blow the
whistle’ on fraud”61 directly to Enron’s Joint Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the Board Kenneth Lay.62 Rather than address the underlying
issue, Enron executives immediately went to their outside counsel to inquire
as to the “risks associated with discharging . . . employees who report
allegations of improper accounting practices.”63 Presented with the same
choice on several occasions, Enron chose to fire employees who reported
fraud rather than fire the accounting firm that committed the fraud.64
In complex corporate fraud schemes, corporate insiders are the only
witnesses to fraud who can report “who knew what, and when.”65 For this
reason, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that a “‘corporate code of
silence’ not only hampers investigations, but also creates a climate where
ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity.”66 While the law at
the time already protected government employees who acted “in the public
interest by reporting wrongdoing,”67 “employees of publicly traded
companies who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors” were

59. KOHN ET AL., supra note 36, at xi.
60. See id. Time Magazine subsequently named two such whistleblowers, Sherron
Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, “Persons of the Year” in 2002. Richard Lacayo & Amanda
Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30; see supra notes 32–35 and
accompanying text.
61. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002).
62. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 151; see also Text of Letter to Enron’s Chairman After
Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/
01/16/business/text-of-letter-to-enron-s-chairman-after-departure-of-chief-executive.html
[https://perma.cc/7754-SD36].
63. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5.
64. See id. (citing New York Times and Houston Chronicle reports that a top risk
management official at Enron and a partner at Andersen (Enron’s accounting firm), among
others, suffered negative employment actions as a result of reporting concerns over Enron’s
accounting practices).
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 10.
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completely without protection.68 With half of all Americans invested in
public companies, such a disparity “fails to serve the public good.”69
By enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress set a “national floor for employee
protections in the context of publicly traded companies”70 in order to unify
the “patchwork and vagaries of . . . state laws”71 protecting employees who
reported fraud. In response to the Senate conference committee report that
recommended additional whistleblower protections, Senator Patrick Leahy
stated: “[T]hese corporate insiders are the key witnesses that need to be
encouraged to report fraud and help prove it in court . . . . There is no way
we could have known about [the high-level corporate fraud at Enron] without
that kind of whistleblower.”72
To encourage the reporting of illegal activity, Sarbanes-Oxley integrated
extensive “top-down” internal control measures that forced securities issuers
and public companies to create and maintain internal compliance
mechanisms.73 However, while creating avenues to report wrongdoing
within a corporation may be necessary to prevent corporate fraud, it is not
sufficient if no one makes use of them.74 One roadblock to establishing a
successful whistleblowing regime is the very real threat of retaliation that
whistleblowers face.75 Therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley takes an additional step in
an attempt to assuage these fears: it protects whistleblowers against
retaliation when they choose to report information that they “reasonably
believe[] constitutes a violation of . . . any rule or regulation of the
[SEC] . . . [to] a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or
such other person working for the employer who has the authority to

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 19.
72. 148 CONG. REC. S7358 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
73. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012) (requiring an “executive officer” and a “financial
officer” to sign their corporation’s annual or quarterly report to the Commission certifying that
they “are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; have designed such
internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the [company] is made known
to such officers . . . ; have evaluated the effectiveness of the [company’s] internal
controls . . . ; and have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their
internal controls . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (requiring that public companies’ audit
committees “establish procedures for . . . the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of the [company] of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters” or be forcibly unlisted from the national securities exchanges and national securities
associations). For a general overview on the corporate governance systems encouraged by the
Dodd-Frank Amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley, see Nick M. Beermann, Understanding SOX
Whistleblower Protections, in UNDERSTANDING SOX WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS:
LEADING LAWYERS ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AND RECOGNIZING/PREVENTING
CONDUCT THAT LEADS TO CLAIMS 27 (2016).
74. Even as early as 2001, the New York Stock Exchange had already instituted widely
adopted rules requiring publicly listed companies to institute substantially similar board-level
financial auditing mechanisms, and, in fact, Enron’s 2001 proxy statement was “a pristine
example of compliance” with these rules. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1334–35 (2002).
75. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
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investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”76 It also sets a procedure
by which a whistleblower may seek relief for a discriminatory action or
discharge77 and entitles a prevailing whistleblower to compensatory
damages.78
Unfortunately, however, Sarbanes-Oxley’s measures have been
insufficient to encourage the whistleblowing that the SEC relies on for
successful enforcement.79 In fact, there is no evidence that the whistleblower
protection provided by Sarbanes-Oxley has had any effect on the total
percentage of frauds brought to light.80 Even at its most effective, SarbanesOxley sought narrowly to prevent accounting fraud81 but was inadequate to
protect against widespread financial manipulation and to prevent financial
crisis.82 The crisis of 2008 made this deficiency all the more apparent.83
Sarbanes-Oxley could not stand alone if Congress wished to ensure structural
integrity in the American financial market.
2. Dodd-Frank Raised That Standard
Dodd-Frank describes itself as “[a]n Act [t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system.”84 Not surprisingly, because corporate insiders remain the
only firsthand witnesses to corporate malfeasance who can report “who knew
what, and when,”85 encouraging whistleblowing is a critical mechanism for
accomplishing Dodd-Frank’s lofty goals.
The financial crisis in 2008 that gave birth to Dodd-Frank “create[d] a
greater reliance on whistleblowers and whistleblowing laws.”86 And yet,
while Sarbanes-Oxley protected whistleblowers against retaliation, it did not
give them any financial incentive to report wrongdoing.87 To create these
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
77. Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (adopting the existing procedures in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).
78. Id. § 1514A(c)(1)–(2). Such damages include back pay and special damages including
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees. Id.
79. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
80. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2216 (2010).
81. See supra note 42.
82. Compare Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits
in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2007) (defining three of SarbanesOxley’s “four major goals” as self-regulatory mechanisms: improving corporate governance,
strengthening financial reporting and disclosure, and improving corporate internal controls
and auditor performance), with Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform,
29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012) (“[The 2008 crisis] made painfully clear what should have
been apparent all along: that financial institutions cannot be left to regulate themselves.”).
83. See supra note 42.
84. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). Others have rephrased this plain
description, preferring instead to say Dodd-Frank intends “to limit the risk of contemporary
finance . . . [and] to limit the damage caused by the failure of a large financial institution.”
SKEEL, supra note 20, at 4.
85. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (commenting on Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower
protections).
86. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 157.
87. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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incentives, and thereby increase whistleblowing and corporate compliance,
Dodd-Frank included section 922.88
Undoubtedly, Dodd-Frank seeks to provide general protection and rewards
for whistleblowers.89 However, federal district and circuit courts, the SEC,
and various scholars disagree on whether Dodd-Frank specifically protects
only external whistleblowers who report to the SEC or if Dodd-Frank also
protects internal whistleblowers who report to their own supervisors.90
II. DODD-FRANK SECTION 922
Section 922 begins by defining a whistleblower generally91 and then
defines those whistleblowing acts it intends to protect and reward.92 In light
of arguable ambiguity in these definitions, the SEC has issued a rule to clarify
Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower.93
A. Section 922’s Language and Structure
Section 922 outlines specific criteria by which an employee with relevant
information may qualify as a whistleblower. Additionally, it outlines the
ways in which she may avail herself of the SEC’s financial rewards and
employment protection when she discloses potentially illegal activity.
1. The Statutory Definition of Whistleblower
In section 922(a)(6), Dodd-Frank explicitly defines whistleblower as “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”94 After defining whistleblowers generally,
the statute creates a system of incentives and protections for whistleblowers
who otherwise may have been reluctant to share their information.95

88. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection” (emphasis added)), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“Whistleblower Protection for
Employees of Publicly Traded Companies” (emphasis added)).
89. See infra Part II.
90. Compare infra Part II.B, with infra Part III.A, and infra Part III.B.
91. See infra Part II.A.1.
92. See infra Part II.A.2–3.
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). When a whistleblower makes her report to the
Commission or to another authority outside the organization of which she is a part, she is
referred to as an “external whistleblower.” See infra note 115 and accompanying text
(describing an internal whistleblower—an employee who reports a violation to a supervisor or
someone else within the organization).
95. A common complaint of the securities whistleblower regime under Sarbanes-Oxley
was that it failed to provide monetary rewards and professional protections adequate to
incentivize whistleblowers to actually report violations. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX
and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1773 (2007); see also Richard Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (2012)
(“Unfortunately, even if Sarbanes-Oxley encouraged employees to report more frequently, the
Act often failed to protect them from reprisals and failed to compensate them consistently for
the retaliation they suffered.”).
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2. For Bounties: Originality of Information
One significant addition Dodd-Frank made to Sarbanes-Oxley was the way
in which it provides financial rewards to whistleblowers.96 Instead of merely
protecting the whistleblower against financial loss in case of retaliation, it
also provides the whistleblower an opportunity for financial gain.97 If a
whistleblower meets certain criteria and her report results in the SEC
imposing sanctions98 against the violating organization, the SEC will
“award”99 that whistleblower 10–30 percent of the total sanction it collects
from the violating organization.100
One criterion for the collection of a monetary reward is originality of
information. To collect a bounty under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower must
voluntarily provide “original information” to the Commission.101 The statute
defines original information as “information that is derived from the
independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower; is not known to the
Commission from any other source . . . and is not exclusively derived from
an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental

96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
97. Compare id. (describing Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowing rewards), with Part I.C.1
(describing Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation protection).
98. The sanctions must total more than $1 million for a whistleblower to collect a bounty
based on Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “covered judicial or administrative action.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(a)(1).
99. Many scholars refer to this award more fittingly as a “bounty.” See, e.g., Jennifer M.
Pacella, Inside or Out?: The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation
Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 727 (2014) (referring to DoddFrank’s whistleblower award system as a “bounty scheme”).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)–(c). The award or bounty amount is increased or decreased
according to factors under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B). Because the SEC imposes incredibly
high sanctions for major securities violations, these bounties have been accordingly
astronomical. See Amelia Toy Rudolph, If a Whistle Blows In-House Does It Still Make a
Sound?: Issues Regarding Internal Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank (pt. 1), PRAC. LAW.
Aug. 2016, at 57, 57 (“Under this program, the SEC has authorized over 30 monetary awards
to whistleblowers through May 2016, including one award in 2014 for over $30 million and
another award in 2015 for the statutory maximum of 30% . . . . In May 2016 alone, the SEC
announced three whistleblower awards totaling between $9 and $10 million, each to corporate
insiders.”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct.
1, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539854258#.UoY
fjo0mwl0 (reporting a $14 million whistleblower award, the SEC’s highest award as of
October 2013) [https://perma.cc/QQ6G-TLYG]; Ed Beeson, Three Little Words: Confusion
over Dodd-Frank Is Leaving Whistleblowers Exposed, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:43 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/838091 (reporting a $22 million award given in August
2016, a $17 million award given in June 2016, and a total of $107 million in rewards given
since the program’s inception) [https://perma.cc/6EV7-7BDC]. Whether the SEC’s
aggressive reward system will continue under President Donald Trump remains to be seen.
See Carmen Germaine, Big SEC Whistleblower Bounties Won’t Change with Trump, LAW360
(Nov. 14, 2016, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/862235/big-sec-whistleblowerbounties-won-t-change-with-trump [https://perma.cc/TT9Z-77DF]. But see C. Ryan Barber,
Could Donald Trump’s SEC Soften Enforcement of Severance Agreements?, NAT’L L.J. (Nov.
16, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202772529048/Could-Donald-TrumpsSEC-Soften-Enforcement-of-Severance-Agreements?slreturn=20170026141958
[https://perma.cc/E7CV-G792].
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
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report, hearing, audit, or investigation.”102 The SEC subsequently refined
this definition by issuing rules to define “independent knowledge” and
“independent analysis,” which are not defined in the statute.103 “Independent
knowledge” is “factual information . . . not derived from publicly available
sources.”104 Additionally,
[a] whistleblower who learns about possible violations only through a
company’s internal investigation will ordinarily be excluded from claiming
“independent knowledge” by . . . Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii)
(relating to attorneys, auditors, and other persons who may be involved in
the conduct of internal investigations), or by Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(vi)
(excluding information learned from such individuals).105

Combining these rules on independent knowledge and original information
with the bounty provisions of the statute means that corporate officers,
compliance personnel, and attorneys would usually be precluded from
collecting a bounty for reporting potential violations to the SEC when they
learn of such information in their capacity as internal investigators.106
However, in order to extend protection against retaliatory employment
actions, the statute states that “[n]o employer may [retaliate107] against[] a
whistleblower . . . because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—in
providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section.”108
Based on this close reading, the Commission stated in Rule 21F-2(b)(1)(iii)
that the retaliation protections apply to whistleblowers irrespective of
whether they are ultimately entitled to an award.109 Such a reading,
according to the Commission, is “compelled by the text of [section
922(h)(1)].”110
Therefore, nothing in the language of Dodd-Frank prevents the SEC from
extending protection to a whistleblower who provides information to the
SEC, even when that information is not original information that qualifies for
a bounty.
3. For Protection: Who Hears the Whistle Blow
In its antiretaliation provision, section 922 stipulates that an employer may
not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in
any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower” because the
whistleblower has “provid[ed] information to the Commission in accordance
102. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(A)–(C).
103. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4 (2016).
104. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(2).
105. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,311
(June 13, 2011).
106. See infra Part III.C.2.
107. For the purposes of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections and this Note generally,
to retaliate includes to “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or
in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)–(A)(i) (emphasis added) (noting that only “information” is
required for protection, not original information).
109. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304.
110. Id.
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with [section 922]; . . . initiat[ed], testif[ied] in, or assist[ed] in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or [has made] disclosures that are
required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”111
Therefore, Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation protections apply to three classes
of complaint: “information provided to the SEC, involvement with an SEC
investigation and disclosures that are protected under [the] Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.”112 Ambiguity surrounding the final class—disclosures
protected under Sarbanes-Oxley—has caused disagreement among circuit
courts. This disagreement is the focus of this Note.113
As discussed above,114 the “disclosures that are protected under SarbanesOxley” include disclosures wherein an employee “provide[s] information”
related to an SEC rule violation to “a Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency; any Member of Congress . . . ; or a person with supervisory authority
over the employee (or other such person working for the employer who has
the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”115 By
including these disclosures, Sarbanes-Oxley conceives of a wider class of
whistleblowers than Dodd-Frank does. Dodd-Frank references only “the
Commission” anywhere it mentions a recipient of whistleblower information
and, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, does not directly acknowledge whistleblower
reports to employers.116
B. The SEC’s Interpretation of Section 922
By integrating Sarbanes-Oxley protections into Dodd-Frank, the
legislature created an ambiguity. Sarbanes-Oxley protects whistleblowers
when they report to their supervisors—that is, not to the SEC.117 But to
qualify as a whistleblower in the first place, Dodd-Frank requires that the
individual report to the SEC.118 Faced with these conflicting provisions,119
the SEC issued a rule to define whistleblower,120 pursuant to its authority

111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
112. R. Scott Oswald & David L. Scher, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy Creates Circuit Split on
Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protections, WESTLAW J. EMP., Nov. 10, 2015, at 1, 2. But see
infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
114. See supra Part I.C.1.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining “whistleblower” as an individual who
provides “information . . . to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting retaliation
against an employee who “provid[es] information to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(h)(2)
(prohibiting the Commission from disclosing any information “provided by a whistleblower
to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(B) (requiring that the Commission not know
“information” for that information to be “original”).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(a)(1)(C).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
119. Compare id. § 78u-6(a)(6), with id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), and 18 U.S.C. §
1514(A)(a)(1)(C).
120. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304
(June 13, 2011) (interpreting § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii) as providing antiretaliation protection when
“employees report to . . . a person with supervisory authority over the employee or such other
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under Dodd-Frank and the Securities Exchange Act.121 After undergoing
notice and comment,122 the SEC clarified that because Dodd-Frank’s
retaliation protections integrate Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation protections,
Dodd-Frank must extend its protection to internal whistleblowers—those
employees of public companies who report violations to their supervisor or
“such other person working for the employer who has authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct” as specified in SarbanesUnlike the aforementioned interpretation that section
Oxley.123
922(h)(1)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii) apply to three classes of complaint,124 the SEC
interpreted them as applying to “three different categories of
whistleblowers.”125 The third category “includes individuals who report to
persons . . . other than the Commission.”126
III. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 922
The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the SEC, and various scholars
disagree as to whether section 922 only protects external whistleblowers who
report to the SEC or whether it also protects internal whistleblowers who
report to their supervisors. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
may soon issue opinions concurring either with the Second or the Fifth
Circuit.127 Where the Second Circuit has recognized ambiguity within the
statute and therefore deferred to the SEC’s more expansive interpretation,128
the Fifth Circuit, finding no such ambiguity, has not deferred to the SEC and
therefore has taken the narrower interpretation.129

person working for the employer who has authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct”).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (granting the Commission authority to “issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [section 922]
consistent with the purposes of [section 922]”).
122. See Proposed Rules for Implementing Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 75
Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010).
123. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304.
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304
(emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. See infra note 131.
128. See infra Part III.A.1.
129. See infra Part III.B.1.
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A. The Courts That Find Ambiguity Defer to the SEC
and Protect All Internal Whistleblowers
The Second Circuit130 and a majority of district courts131 have deferred to
the SEC’s interpretation132 and concluded that Dodd-Frank protects
whistleblowers who report violations within their corporation.133 The
Second Circuit’s decision is grounded in interpretive and policy
justifications, but it faces significant challenges. The Whistleblower
Augmented Reward and Nonretaliation Act of 2016 is congruous with the
Second Circuit’s decision. Among other things, the act provides protection
for all internal whistleblowers.
1. Why the Second Circuit Deferred to the SEC
Courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation where the organic statute is
ambiguous and the agency has been charged with making rules to interpret
that ambiguity.134 The Second Circuit looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent ruling in King v. Burwell135 to find this requisite ambiguity and defer
to the SEC.136
130. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the
definition of “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank sufficiently ambiguous to “defer to the
reasonable interpretive rule adopted by the appropriate agency”).
131. Kristin Goodchild, Securities/Administrative Law—Internal Reporters Who Blow the
Whistle: Are They Protected Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision?, 38 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 23 n.155 (2016) (listing the courts that have heard the issue). The Third
Circuit is set to issue an opinion on the issue. See Danon v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. 15-6864,
2016 WL 2988987 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-2881 (3d. Cir. June 22,
2016). However, because the lower court found that “issue preclusion forestall[ed] any
analysis of whether Plaintiff’s activities were ‘protected’ under Dodd-Frank” it is uncertain
whether the Third Circuit will address the issue. Id. at *5 n.5. The Sixth Circuit recently had
the opportunity to weigh in but dismissed the complaint instead because it did not allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Verble v. Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney, LLC, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017). However,
the Sixth Circuit will have another opportunity to rule on the issue in Deykes v. CooperStandard Automotive, Inc., No. 16-cv-11828, 2016 WL 6873395 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2016),
appeal filed, No. 16-2740 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016). The Seventh Circuit will also soon have
the chance to weigh in. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-C-352, 2016 WL
4507317 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-3502 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2016). In
the Eleventh Circuit, a plaintiff has appealed his internal whistleblower claims after losing in
the court below. Duke v. Prestige Cruises Int’l, Inc., No. 14-23017-CIV-KING, 2015 WL
4886088 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-15426, 2015 WL 4886088 (11th Cir.
Aug. 11, 2016).
132. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304
(June 13, 2011).
133. Very recently, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion concurring with the Second Circuit
and affirming the decision of the Northern District of California. See Somers v. Dig. Realty
Tr., Inc., No. 15-17352, 2017 WL 908245 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017). Instead of simply deferring
to the SEC, the Ninth Circuit found that section 922 “unambiguously and expressly protects
from retaliation all those who report to the SEC and who report internally.” Id. at *9. However,
the Court added that “even if the use of the word ‘whistleblower’ in the anti-retaliation
provision creates uncertainty because of the earlier narrow definition of the term, the [SEC]
has resolved any ambiguity and its regulation is entitled to deference.” Id. at *12.
134. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
135. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
136. See infra Part III.A.1.b.
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To determine ambiguity courts look to a term’s context within a statute and
the implications a distinct interpretation will have on the other parts of the
statute.137 A court is more inclined to defer to an agency “whenever decision
as to the meaning or reach of a statute [involves] reconciling conflicting
policies.”138 This is especially so when the interpretation has “depended
upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations.”139 If the agency’s interpretation “represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute,” a court will not upend that interpretation unless
“it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”140
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy,141 the Second Circuit addressed the tension
between the whistleblower definition and whistleblower-protected acts in
light of King.142 In King, the Supreme Court considered a provision in the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) that makes income tax subsidies available only
to those who purchased health insurance on “an [e]xchange established by
the State.”143 Ultimately, the Court determined that “the operation of the
entire statute would be undermined” if such a limiting provision did not
include subsidies for those who purchase health insurance on exchanges
“established by the State or by the Federal Government.”144 In doing so, the
Court implicitly added “or by the Federal Government” into the statute.145
Even though the Court in King did not face a question of deference—
because the ACA did not implicitly delegate authority146—the Second
Circuit still used King’s reasoning in Berman.147 In Berman, the Second
Circuit recognized that within section 922 there is no “absolute conflict”
137. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (“[T]he plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself,
[but as well by] the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))). Because “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional
possibilities but of statutory context,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), “[t]he
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed
in context,” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132
(2000). Even when the question is not one of ambiguity or deference and a court has clear
authority to interpret a statute’s language, “[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
138. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
139. Id. (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 382).
140. Id. at 845 (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383).
141. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
142. Id. at 150.
143. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A),
(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)).
144. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (interpreting the King decision).
145. Id.
146. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
147. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. The Second Circuit even found that the issue in King was
“far more problematic” than the issue faced in Berman. Id. (“In our case, . . . the issue is not
whether [the] phrase means something other than what it literally says.”).
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between the whistleblower definition’s Commission reporting requirement
and the absence of such a requirement in the Sarbanes-Oxley integration in
section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii).148 Tension remains, however, “between the
[whistleblower] definition . . . and the limited protection provided by
sub[section] (iii) . . . if it is subject to that definition.”149 Therefore, the
Second Circuit held, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in
King, that there was at least sufficient ambiguity within section 922, in light
of “the sharply limiting effect of a Commission reporting requirement,”150 to
trigger Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation.151 The Second
Circuit, with the majority of district courts,152 protects internal
whistleblowers based on this deference.
2. Interpretive Merits of Internal Protection
Part of the tension in Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection provisions
stems from the fact that a Commission reporting requirement would render
the third protected category—those who report wrongdoing to their
Subsection (iii), which integrates
supervisors—effectively moot.153
Sarbanes-Oxley, only provides protection above and beyond subsection (i)
and (ii) for people who report violations internally.154 But those people
would not constitute whistleblowers, because they have not reported the
violation to the SEC.155 If subsection (iii) was not meant to bring internal
148. Id. at 150–51 (“Although the simultaneous employer/Commission reporting example
avoids an absolute contradiction between the [provisions], a significant tension within [section
922] nevertheless remains.”); see infra notes 207–11 and accompanying text (describing the
Fifth Circuit’s competing interpretation in which the provisions are not deemed ambiguous,
because a simultaneous reporting scenario avoids absolute contradiction).
149. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
150. Id. at 152.
151. Such an agency rule enjoys Chevron deference from the courts so long as the provision
is ambiguous and the rule is a permissible interpretation of the provision. Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If . . . Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”). As a threshold matter, Chevron deference is
appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
226–27 (2001). Here, the SEC issued Rule 21F pursuant to an explicit authorization in 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) to “issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of [section 922]” and with 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1)
granting general rulemaking authority to the SEC on all matters related to Securities
Exchanges. And, the SEC promulgated this legislative rule through notice-and-comment
procedures. See Proposed Rules for Implementing Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions,
75 Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010). So the SEC’s Rule 21F has the force of law and may
qualify for deference under Chevron.
152. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (naming the Northern District of California, Southern
District of New York, District of New Jersey, District of Kansas, District of Massachusetts,
District of Colorado, Middle District of Tennessee, and District of Connecticut as courts that
defer).
153. Id. at 152.
154. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), with id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
155. See supra Part II.A.
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whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank’s protection, a court would be unlikely to
find a reason why Congress included it.156
3. Policy Benefits of Internal Protection
Many scholars, going beyond statutory interpretation, advocate protecting
internal whistleblowers on policy grounds. The SEC’s decision to protect
internal whistleblowers was aimed at motivating them to come forward
without fear of retaliation so that the benefits of internal compliance
mechanisms, as conceived by Sarbanes-Oxley, could be realized.157 In this,
Dodd-Frank has been largely successful—internal reporting after its passage
consistently set and surpassed “all-time highs.”158 Yet, a 2010 study of
employee-whistleblowers showed that in 82 percent of cases, employees who
reported violations were retaliated against—they either were terminated, quit
under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities.159 Additionally,
whistleblowers’ fear of retaliation is not merely financial. Internal
whistleblowers also face the very real social threats of “ostracism, isolation,
blacklisting, defamation, job stagnation, and personal consequences such as
depression and family problems.”160 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “[w]hen

156. Courts will not interpret Congress as drafting meaningless provisions. Marx v. Gen.
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage ‘assists only
where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.’”
(quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011))). But see infra notes
207–11 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s “simultaneous reporting”
hypothetical that appears to give subsection (iii) meaning even with a Commission reporting
requirement).
157. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359
(June 13, 2011).
158. See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, Employees’ Internal Fraud Reports Rise Even in Wake of SEC
Whistleblower Program, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8, A-9 (Apr. 10, 2012). Ninety-seven
percent of whistleblowers choose to report internally rather than externally in the first instance.
ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE
2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 13 (2012). And, more than 80 percent of
whistleblowers seeking bounties from the SEC have first reported internally. See Ben Protess
& Nathaniel Popper, Hazy Future for Thriving S.E.C. Whistle-Blower Effort, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Apr. 23, 2013, 9:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/hazy-futurefor-s-e-c-s-whistle-blower-office/ [https://perma.cc/WV5C-2YBN]; see also Orly Lobel,
Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New
Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2009) (arguing that “internal protections are
particularly crucial in view of research findings that . . . employees are more likely to choose
internal reporting systems”).
159. Dyck et al., supra note 80, at 2216.
160. Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 97–98
(2013); see also AUGUST B. MUNDEL, ETHICS IN QUALITY 132 (1991) (“Many [whistleblowers]
find it extremely difficult to find new positions at equivalent levels giving rise to the view that
influential people . . . have acted to blackball the individuals.”); Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3350
(“Whistleblowers commonly fear . . . that they will have to ‘live their lives in misery, shunned
by employers.’” (quoting Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 91, 124 (2007))); John Carreyrou, Theranos Whistleblower Shook the Company—And
His Family, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theranoswhistleblower-shook-the-companyand-his-family-1479335963 (telling the story of Theranos
whistleblower Tyler Shultz and how his internal report caused the estrangement of his
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employees perceive that they will be subject to retaliation for which they have
no recourse in the courts, they are less likely to report to their supervisors any
instances of wrongdoing.”161
When internal whistleblowers are protected, corporations themselves stand
to gain from the resulting increase in internal reporting. Some scholars have
argued that in a system highly protective of internal whistleblowers,
corporations are better positioned to address compliance issues before they
become serious or perhaps even before they grow into sanctionable
offenses.162 Effective internal compliance mechanisms, as another scholar
argues, provide companies with “enormous benefits.”163 These mechanisms
better assure companies that they are adhering to the laws and regulations
governing their actions; instill in employees a “culture of compliance”164 that
combats any resistance, gaming, or self-interest that may otherwise control
employee action;165 and may even diminish overall regulatory burdens.166
When the SEC considered internal protections in Dodd-Frank,
commenters emphasized the need to encourage internal whistleblowing.167
They argued that this inclusion would enable corporations to avoid resourceintensive litigation by discovering and resolving potential violations
earlier.168 They also argued that corporations that are able to demonstrate an
effective internal compliance program may receive mitigated penalties if held
criminally liable for a securities violation.169
Additionally, the SEC stands to gain significantly if whistleblowers can
confidently report internally before subjecting the SEC to potentially
frivolous tips. Scholars and courts routinely point out that the tips reported
to the SEC significantly improve in quality when internal reporting precedes
external reporting.170 Upon releasing the SEC’s rule as to internal
grandfather, former Secretary of State and Theranos board member George Schultz) [https://
perma.cc/3LQH-3TSJ].
161. Pacella, supra note 99, at 756–57.
162. See Lauren J. Resnick et al., Anyone Can Whistle, 28 CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (2013).
163. Pacella, supra note 99, at 760.
164. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1163.
165. Id. at 1160–62.
166. Pacella, supra note 99, at 760.
167. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359
(June 13, 2011).
168. Id.
169. Pacella, supra note 99, at 757.
170. See, e.g., Dressler v. Lime Energy, No. 14-CV-07060(FLW)(DEA), 2015 WL
4773326, at *13 n.7 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015) (“[I]nternal reporting prevents the SEC from
receiving reports of mere misunderstandings . . . so that the Commission would receive fewer
and higher quality reports . . . . ‘[External only protection] encourages reports to the SEC that
could be more efficiently handled internally, thus wasting government resources.’” (quoting
Bussing v. Cor Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014))); Bussing, 20 F. Supp.
3d at 733 (“[internal reporting] will help vet the tips to the SEC, so that the SEC receives fewer
and higher quality reports”); Caroline E. Keen, Note, Clarifying What Is “Clear”:
Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215,
234 (2015) (explaining that bypassing internal reporting would result in lower quality tips and
could cause “significant waste of corporate and government resources”). But see Dave
Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO
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whistleblowers, then-SEC Chairwoman Mary L. Schapiro said that “[w]hile
the SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and complaints, the
quality of the tips we have received has been better since Dodd-Frank became
law.”171
4. Policy Challenges to Protecting
All Internal Whistleblowers
Protecting internal whistleblowers may be justified on certain policy
grounds, but providing protection to all internal whistleblowers does, to a
certain degree, prevent companies from controlling the compliance regimes
that Sarbanes-Oxley requires. Protecting all internal whistleblowers prevents
a company from regulating its internal compliance department’s performance
and threatens the quality of reports.172 For example, under an interpretation
that protects all internal whistleblowers, an ineffective compliance officer
who has failed to report a glaring securities violation to her supervisor may
still receive protection when she finally does, albeit irresponsibly late, report
the violation and is fired for doing so.173 Such a company may also find itself
stifled by its inability to terminate a whistleblower even for legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons. Such reasons may include employee redundancy, the
need to close particular plants or offices, or because the whistleblower’s job
performance is below expectation.174
Furthermore, “overprotection may encourage bad-faith reporting and
exaggerated, or even false, accusations” for those employees who fear job
Some scholars believe that
loss for other, unrelated reasons.175

ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 127 (2011) (expressing doubt as to whether increased
quality will accompany expanded protection); Andrew Walker, Note, Why Shouldn’t We
Protect Internal Whistleblowers?: Exploring Justifications for the Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1761, 1772 (2015) (finding “a bit too optimistic” the idea that internal whistleblowing
protection will “increase the quality of information that the SEC receives”).
171. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm [https://perma.cc/535Z-UG4G].
172. Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic
Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1240 (2010) (“[S]keptics argue that . . . ineffective
workers misuse their protected ‘whistle-blower’ status to avoid discharges or disciplinary
proceedings.”).
173. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards
Enforcement in Germany and Europe—An Economic Perspective, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
143, 158 (2005) (“Protection from retaliation could be utilized by employees to fend off
legitimate criticism or disciplinary measures since they are principally able to claim the status
of a whistle blower.”).
174. LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 132.
175. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151,
1177 (2010); see also LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that some employees, “in an attempt
to manipulate the system,” blow the whistle on legal company activities “when they believe
that their employment is about to be terminated”); W. Michael Hoffman & Robert E. McNulty,
A Business Ethics Theory of Whistleblowing: Responding to the $1 Trillion Question, in
WHISTLEBLOWING: IN DEFENSE OF PROPER ACTION 45, 53 (Marek Arszulowicz & Wojciech
W. Gasparski eds., 2011) (“[W]histleblowing is sometimes done out of vengeance.”);
Ebersole, supra note 170, at 145 n.179 (noting that section 922(a) “only requires that an
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“troublemakers could potentially misuse their whistle-blower status to avoid
being suspended or dismissed from employment.”176 Because of “the
enormous trouble that can result from disciplining a whistle-blower,
supervisors and managers might find it easier to tolerate an unproductive and
ineffective employee rather than dismiss or demote the employee.”177
Therefore, even when “rewards are not provided,” as for Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers, “controlling for such retaliation might nonetheless induce
opportunistic behavior.”178 Dodd-Frank, which does provide whistleblowing
rewards, may be at an even greater risk of inducing such opportunism.
If whistleblower protections were limited only to those who report
externally, a company could avoid enforcement costs by encouraging
effective internal reporting mechanisms, thereby minimizing the number of
external reports.179 Because 97 percent of whistleblowers choose to report
internally rather than externally in the first instance,180 protecting all internal
whistleblowers could significantly decrease corporate efficiency because
companies would be forced to retain inefficient employees. This would be
especially true for the internal compliance departments Sarbanes-Oxley
depends on to facilitate institutional compliance.181
5. The WARN Act: A Proposed Codification
of Internal Protection
Currently before Congress is the Whistleblower Augmented Reward and
Nonretaliation Act of 2016 (“the WARN Act”).182 Introduced February 25,
2016, by Representative Elijah Cummings, the WARN Act proposes a
federal solution to the present circuit split by, among other things, legislating
the SEC’s interpretation of section 922 and protecting all internal
whistleblowers.183 In doing so, however, this bill threatens to further
complicate Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections.
employee report information, not that the employee report accurate information, to obtain
whistleblower protection”).
176. Bowen et al., supra note 172, at 1244 (citing a 1996 study by Frank Anechiarico and
James B. Jacobs that found “several municipal employees in New York City chose to blow
the whistle in order to fall under state protection as a pre-emptive measure to being fired”).
177. Id.
178. Schmidt, supra note 173, at 158.
179. For a holistic analysis on what causes a whistleblower to report externally instead of
internally, see generally Bishara et al., supra note 160.
180. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 13.
181. Vogt, supra note 40, at 375–76 (“Internal reporting and compliance programs are at
the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley . . . . In [its] wake . . . companies expended considerable time and
effort to set up strong internal compliance programs in order to encourage employees to report
violations internally.”); see also Shannon Kay Quigley, Comment, Whistleblower Tug-ofWar: Corporate Attempts to Secure Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External
Monetary Incentives Provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 264–65
(2012); Walker, supra note 170, at 1780 (“If businesses do respond to [an external reporting
requirement] by taking stronger ex ante measures to prevent wrongdoing, such measures will
not only prevent undesirable external whistleblowing but will also ensure that socially
destructive wrongdoing never occurs in the first instance.”).
182. See S. 2591, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 4619, 114th Cong. (2016).
183. See H.R. 4619.
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The WARN Act begins by removing the entire definition of
“whistleblower” from section 922(a)(6).184 It does this despite the fact that
merely striking the words “to the Commission” from the original definition
likely would be sufficient to institute the SEC’s interpretation.185 The
WARN Act then removes the word “whistleblower” from Dodd-Frank’s
retaliation protection provisions.186 Instead, where Dodd-Frank simply uses
the term “whistleblower,” WARN replaces the term with a general
description of the classes of individuals that might become
whistleblowers.187 For example, section 4(c)(1) of the WARN Act strikes
“any lawful act done by the whistleblower” and inserts:
any lawful act done by the applicant, employee, or former employee or
perceived to have been done by the applicant, employee, or former
employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request of the applicant,
employee, or former employee), whether at the initiative of the applicant,
employee, or former employee or in the ordinary course of the duties of the
applicant, employee, or former employee.

The WARN Act also supplements Dodd-Frank section 922(h)(1)(a)’s
subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) by creating two more protected classes of
whistleblower actions. The first is a protection for an applicant, employee,
former employee, or “other such person”—whether whistleblower or not—
who objects or refuses to participate in an act reasonably believed to be a
violation of an SEC law, rule, order, or policy.188 The second is a statutory
protection for internal whistleblowing when reported by an applicant,
employee, former employee, or “other such person.”189
The WARN Act fails to account for the detrimental effects of protecting
all internal whistleblowers, as discussed above.190 Additionally, it creates
internal inconsistencies. For example, section 922’s subsection (iii), which
integrates Sarbanes-Oxley, appears unnecessary with the addition of
WARN’s proposed subsections (iv) and (v). Furthermore, it is not entirely
clear what meaning “other such person” adds to the already included
categories of applicants, employees, and former employees.191 Because of
184. Id. § 4(a).
185. See id. § 4(c). The phrase “to the Commission” alone causes the tension with
subsection (iii) that gives rise to the circuit split. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying
text. Striking “to the Commission” would make Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower
read, “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws
in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” Because the SEC has
issued a rule clarifying that reports can be made internally, internal whistleblowers could be
protected merely by striking “to the Commission” from the definition. See supra Part II.B.
186. The WARN Act also could have protected internal whistleblowers by striking only
the definition of whistleblower but leaving the term throughout Dodd-Frank. Because the term
would have been left undefined, it likely would have been up to the SEC to fill the gap. See
generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512
U.S. 218 (1994).
187. See, e.g., H.R. 4619 §§ 4(c)(1), (c)(4), 5(c)(1).
188. Id. § 4(c)(1)(4)(iv) (proposing a section 922(h)(1)(a)(iv) to Dodd-Frank).
189. Id. § 4(c)(4) (proposing a section 922(h)(1)(a)(v) to Dodd-Frank).
190. See supra Part III.A.4.
191. See supra note 156.
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its confusing structure and its inability to solve the problems created by
blanket internal whistleblower protection, the WARN Act is inadequate as a
legislative solution to this issue.
B. Courts That Find No Ambiguity
Protect No Internal Whistleblowers
The Fifth Circuit192 and a minority of district courts193 have concluded that
Dodd-Frank only protects whistleblowers who report securities law
violations directly to the SEC. While this interpretation finds support both
in text and policy, it also faces significant challenges.
1. Why the Fifth Circuit Did Not Defer to the SEC
For the Fifth Circuit and courts following its interpretation, Dodd-Frank’s
explicit whistleblower definition in section 922(a)(6) marks the critical
foundation for—if not the end of—the requisite analysis.194 In Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C.,195 the Fifth Circuit confidently declared that any
“perceived conflict between [the whistleblower definition] and [the
whistleblower protections] rests on a misreading of the operative provisions
of [section 922].”196 It determined that the definition of the term
whistleblower,197 “standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a
‘whistleblower’” under the whistleblower protection provision.198
Neither of the parties contested this interpretation, nor did Asadi claim to
qualify as a whistleblower under section 922(a)(6).199 Asadi did argue, in
line with the interpretation described above,200 that section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii)
conflicts with this definition because “an individual can take actions falling

192. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that
Dodd-Frank unambiguously “requires individuals to provide information . . . to the SEC” to
qualify as a whistleblower and thereby “qualify for protection”).
193. Goodchild, supra note 131, at 18 n.109 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Verble v. Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney, L.L.C., 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 2015), aff’d on other
grounds, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), cert. denied, No. 16-946,
2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d
640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014
WL 2619501, at *7–8 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749,
756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL
3786643, at *1, *6 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 571 F. App’x 698 (10th
Cir. 2014).
194. The Asadi decision first stated the rule that “[i]f the statutory text is unambiguous, our
inquiry begins and ends with the text.” Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622 (citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United
States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)). The court then held, “We start and end our analysis with
the text.” Id. at 623.
195. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
196. Id. at 624–25.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
198. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
199. Id. at 624.
200. See supra Part III.A.1.
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within this category and, if he does not report information to the SEC, fail to
qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under [section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii)].”201
The court, however, refused to find ambiguity in the statute. It interpreted
section 922(a)(6) as the only definition of “whistleblower”202 and stated that
conflict would exist “only if we read the three categories of protected activity
as additional definitions of three types of whistleblowers.”203 Instead, it read
section 922(a)(6) as an answer to the question, “Who is protected?” In
contrast, it read sections 922(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) as answering the slightly
different question, “What actions by protected individuals constitute
protected activity?”204
The Fifth Circuit bolstered this interpretation with an appeal to the rule
against surplusage. It reasoned that extending protection to a whistleblower
who does not report “to the Commission” would read that phrase out of the
statute.205 The Fifth Circuit then went even further, saying that if the statute
were ambiguous, the court would not be inclined to interpret that ambiguity
in a way that creates such obvious surplusage.206
Finally, the court also presented a hypothetical situation in which
subsection (iii) would add to the whistleblower protections even while
remaining limited to the Commission reporting requirement in the
whistleblower definition. The court reasoned that without subsection (iii), a
whistleblower who is fired after reporting simultaneously to her supervisor
and to the SEC may be without protection.207 For example, if a supervisor
never knew about an employee’s SEC report, the supervisor could not have
retaliated against the employee “because of” the lawful act done “in
providing information to the Commission” under subsection (i).208 Rather,
such a supervisor would be retaliating based on the internal report but would
be doing so against an employee who also made an external report.209 The
court reasoned that subsection (iii)’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration protects the
internal whistleblower who also qualifies as a definitional whistleblower by
“provid[ing] . . . information . . . to the Commission.”210 Therefore, Congress
may have included subsection (iii) to protect whistleblowers in the case of
simultaneous reporting.211

201. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626.
202. Id. at 623 (“When . . . a definitional section says that a word ‘means’ something, the
clear import is that this is its only meaning.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (2012))).
203. Id. at 626.
204. See id. at 625.
205. Id. at 628.
206. Id. (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))).
207. Id. at 627–28.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012); see also supra Part II.A.
209. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28.
210. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
211. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28.

2866

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

2. Interpretive Merits of External-Only Protection
Looking to the rest of Dodd-Frank rules out the possibility that failing to
include explicit internal whistleblower protections was due to congressional
error. If Dodd-Frank only contained one provision related to whistleblowers,
some may defer to the SEC on the grounds that Congress failed to explicitly
protect internal whistleblowers only as an oversight.212 Indeed, the
integration of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection was a last-minute
addition to Dodd-Frank that came out of the final conference without any
record of discussion on the issue.213 This reasoning served as one of the
justifications used by the Northern District of California in finding that
“given the belated addition of subsection (iii), it is at least reasonable to
assume that Congress intended for the scope of [Dodd-Frank’s]
whistleblower-provisions to be broader than in earlier versions of the bill.”214
However, taking a wider view of Dodd-Frank215 actually bolsters the
narrower Asadi interpretation. There are two other provisions in the statute
that relate to protecting whistleblowers: commodities whistleblowers in
section 748216 and whistleblowers who provide information related to
consumer financial protection in section 1057.217

212. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, L.L.C., 801 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2015) (“When conferees
are hastily trying to reconcile House and Senate bills, each of which number hundreds of
pages, and someone succeeds in inserting a new provision like [this one], it is not at all
surprising that no one noticed that the new sub[section] and the definition of ‘whistleblower’
do not fit together neatly.”); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1103 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (suggesting that the “newly-added (and very broad) subsection (iii) and the narrow
whistleblower definition that was consistently present in every version of the bill from its first
introduction in Congress . . . could well have been a legislative oversight”); Ebersole, supra
note 170, at 127 (positing that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions may have been “lost”
in the “2000 pages” of legislation). But see SKEEL, supra note 20, at 4 (noting Dodd-Frank’s
page length is “[a] mere 800 or so when the margins and spacing have been squeezed”); Zach
Deloy, Note, Whistle While You Work: Whistle-Blower Protection Under Dodd-Frank, 62
WAYNE L. REV. 107, 110 (2016) (characterizing Dodd-Frank’s drafting as “fastidious” and its
“language pertaining to whistle-blowers” as “extremely detailed”).
213. Compare H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (as passed by Senate, May
20, 2010), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). However, a good statute interpreter is
careful not to read too much into even a complete dearth of preenactment legislative
discussion. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are
here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative
history. Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.”).
214. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103.
215. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1993)
(“[W]e examine first the language of the governing statute, guided not by ‘a single sentence
or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
51 (1987))). Looking at an entire law to gain clarity on a particular provision is not new. See
United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) (“In expounding a statute, we must
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
216. 7 U.S.C. § 26.
217. 12 U.S.C. § 5567.
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The first of these two provides little assistance here because section 748
copies section 922’s language almost word for word.218 The two are nearly
identical except section 748 replaces the SEC with the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission219 (CFTC) and does not include a third protected
category akin to section 922’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration.220 Most
importantly, though, it omits the confounding provision.
The second whistleblower provision is more illuminating. Under Title X
of Dodd-Frank, Congress passed the Consumer Financial Protection Act of
2010.221 This act created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(CFPB), which, as its name implies, is responsible for regulating “the
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services.”222 In the
effort to accomplish this goal, the CFPB provides whistleblower protection
by prohibiting any person covered by consumer financial laws from
terminating or discriminating against an employee who has
“provided . . . information to the employer, the Bureau, or any other State,
local, or Federal, government authority or law enforcement agency relating
to any violation of . . . any rule, order, standard, or prohibition prescribed by
the Bureau.”223
To find that Dodd-Frank implicitly provides internal whistleblower
protection in Title IX (section 922) after it explicitly provided the same
protection in Title X would violate a core tenant of statutory interpretation,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.224 In other words, if Congress had not
made its intention sufficiently clear when it repeated external-only language
in the CFTC provision, the CFPB provision made it crystal clear that if
218. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
Obviously, section 922 follows after the “Commodity whistleblower incentives and
protection” language in section 748, but, for the purposes of this Note, it is unimportant which
was drafted first and which copied from the other. If the Sarbanes-Oxley integration had been
used even in the earliest versions of Dodd-Frank—which did not include a correlative
commodities whistleblower protection—courts would still face the issue currently under
discussion. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203(g)(1)(A) (as introduced in House, Dec. 2,
2009) (tying whistleblower protection to information provided “to the Commission”).
Interestingly, the only other relevant way in which securities and commodities whistleblower
protections differ in Dodd-Frank is that securities whistleblowers are afforded protection for
“initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action
of the [SEC].” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). Commodities
whistleblowers, on the other hand, are only afforded protection for “assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the [Commodities Futures Trading
Commission].” 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphases added). One is led to wonder how a
court will handle the first commodities whistleblower who suffers a retaliatory firing after
initiating or testifying in a CFTC investigation but who does not otherwise assist in that
investigation. See supra note 212 (describing the “fastidious” way in which Dodd-Frank was
drafted).
219. 12 U.S.C. § 5301(5).
220. See 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
221. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010).
222. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
223. Id. § 5567(a)(1) (emphasis added).
224. See Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (“[W]hen ‘Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another[,]’ . . . this Court
‘presume[s]’ that Congress intended a difference in meaning.” (fourth alteration in original)
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
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Congress had wished to include internal whistleblowers, it knew how to do
so.225
3. Interpretive Challenges to Protecting
Only External Whistleblowers
Pragmatically speaking, the Fifth Circuit’s textual interpretation also may
be flawed. The court reasoned that subsection (iii) adds additional protection
to section 922 in the anomalous situation where a whistleblower has reported
to the SEC and reported internally.226 If the whistleblower’s supervisor has
no knowledge of the SEC report and fires the whistleblower for the internal
report, the whistleblower still meets section 922(a)(6)’s definition of a
whistleblower (someone who reports to the SEC) and is protected under
subsection (iii)’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration (having been fired for reporting
a violation to a supervisor).227 On such a reading, without subsection (iii),
this whistleblower may not have been protected because the supervisor, not
privy to the SEC report, could not have fired the whistleblower because of
the SEC report.228
However, this hypothetical ignores critical whistleblower realities that
render it all but impossible. Those who choose to report internally usually
do so because they know and trust their direct supervisors.229 Alternatively,
employees choose to report externally if “the overall culture or the ethics of
their top managers or supervisors is perceived to be weak”—that is, if they
do not know and trust their direct supervisors.230 Whistleblowers are also
inclined to report externally as the severity of the violation increases.231
These practicalities of whistleblower decision making make it unlikely that
a whistleblower would choose to report externally (motivated in part by
distrust in her supervisor) before then reporting internally to a supervisor.232
Similarly, if the severity of the violation motivates the whistleblower to
report externally, it is unlikely she would take the drastic step of reporting
externally, then “take the less drastic step of reporting internally.”233
Furthermore, according to a 2011 survey, only 3 percent of whistleblower
reports are made externally rather than internally.234 Necessarily, an even
225. The CFTC has used this very whistleblowing protection to grant whistleblower awards
in excess of $10 million. Bryan B. House et al., Review of Recent Whistleblower
Developments: SEC, CFTC, Amicus Brief, Verble v. Morgan Stanley, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr.
12, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/review-recent-whistleblower-developmentssec-cftc-amicus-brief-verble-v-morgan [https://perma.cc/VUB2-AZ4H].
226. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
229. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 11.
230. Id. at 13.
231. Id. at 14.
232. Vogt, supra note 40, at 368–69; see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 801 F.3d 145, 151
(2d Cir. 2015) (“[A]lthough there may be some potential whistleblowers who will report
wrongdoing simultaneously to their employer and the Commission, they are likely to be few
in number.”).
233. Vogt, supra note 40, at 369.
234. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 13.
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smaller percentage are made internally after being made externally.
Therefore, the reading proposed by the court in Asadi interprets Congress as
adopting all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections to protect the fewer than 3
percent of whistleblowers who make internal reports after making external
reports.235 Because a Commission reporting requirement would effectively
reduce subsection (iii)’s robust Sarbanes-Oxley integration to a protection
used only in an exceptionally rare circumstance,236 it is “doubtful” that
Congress expected subsection (iii) to have such an “extremely limited
scope.”237 Because of this ambiguity, the Fifth Circuit may have been
mistaken in not relying on the SEC’s reasonable interpretation.238
4. Policy Challenges to Protecting
Only External Whistleblowers
An interpretation that protects only external whistleblowers would result
in increased cost for the SEC and impossible requirements of corporate
counsel.
a. Protecting Only External Whistleblowers
Would Be More Expensive for the SEC
Scholars recognize that protecting only external whistleblowers, even if
correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, will result in increased reports
to the SEC and decreased internal reports.239 Some have posited that
increased SEC reporting would swell the SEC’s coffers due to an increase in
the total number of fines collected.240 This conclusion is a natural result of
the presumption that “[i]nternal whistleblowing protects organizational
interests at the expense of the public treasury.”241 Relatedly, others have
argued that in circumstances where the need for external enforcement persists
even after the illegal conduct has ended, an internal reporting model would

235. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 152 (“In light of these realities . . . the question becomes
whether Congress intended to add sub[section] (iii) to subsection [922](h)(1)(A) only to
achieve such a limited result.”).
236. Id. (“[A]part from the rare example of simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) reporting
of wrongdoing to an employer and to the Commission, there would be virtually no situation
where an SEC reporting requirement would leave sub[section] (iii) with any scope.”).
237. Id. at 155.
238. Id.
239. Pacella, supra note 99, at 725; Deloy, supra note 212, at 116 (arguing that externalonly protection may cause “increase[d] reporting to the SEC” while “internal reporting would
be greatly reduced”); Heidi L. Hansberry, Comment, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the DoddFrank Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 206 (2012)
(arguing that Dodd-Frank’s “[s]tronger whistleblower protections and incentives will likely
cause an increase in . . . reporting”); Keen, supra note 170, at 234 (noting the “greater number
of disclosures” to the SEC in an system where employees “bypass[] internal reporting”).
240. Walker, supra note 170, at 1778.
241. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 335
(1992) (emphasis added).
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insulate companies from their acts’ negative externalities at the expense of
the public at large.242
However, such an understanding ignores the fact that if compliance is the
goal, requiring ex post enforcement is necessarily more expensive than ex
ante compliance.243 As the SEC itself has made clear, the internal
whistleblower protection in Rule 21F was at least partly motivated by a
concern that “the Commission will ‘incur costs to process and validate’
whistleblower ‘tips of varying quality’ if companies are not allowed ‘to
investigate and respond to potential securities laws violations prior to
reporting them to the Commission.’”244 Internal reporting “help[s] vet the
tips to the SEC, so that the SEC receives fewer and higher quality reports
from whistleblowers.”245 For this reason, an external-only protection model
“is over-inclusive, as it encourages reports to the SEC that could be more
efficiently handled internally.”246 Directing all such reports to the SEC
threatens to “wast[e] government resources generally and divert[] resources
from cases that need the SEC’s full attention.”247
The SEC’s goal under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank is to shrink the
need for enforcement actions in the first place by creating sufficient
disincentives for noncompliance and effectively instilling a culture of
compliance within corporations and among employees.248 The purpose of
the SEC’s enforcement should not be to support a complex regulatory
ecosystem that diverts corporate earnings to better monitor corporations. By
giving whistleblowers protection and awarding them bounties when they do
not report internally, the external-only model threatens to increase total cost.
Employees may be incentivized to sit on a fraudulent scheme and only report
to the SEC when it has grown large enough to warrant a bounty.249 The same
employee in a model that protects internal whistleblowing would be
incentivized from internally reporting the fraud the moment it is detected. In
theory, this would prevent the fraud from growing and thus preempt the need
for enforcement action by the SEC.250
242. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1656 (2008)
(explaining that in circumstances where the damage caused by a violation is ongoing, as in
environmental regulations, behavior change resulting from an internal report may result in
underenforcement).
243. See Bishara et al., supra note 160, at 76.
244. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,516 (Nov. 17, 2010)); see also
Lobel, supra note 158, at 1250 (arguing “internal protections are particularly crucial in view
of research findings that . . . employees are more likely to choose internal reporting systems”).
245. Bussing v. Cor Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014) (“[Internal
reporting] allows companies to remedy improper conduct at an early stage, perhaps before it
rises to the level of a violation.”).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Pacella, supra note 99, at 760.
249. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733; Ebersole, supra note 170, at 153–54.
250. Stephanie Klein, Comment, Interpreting the Definition of a Whistleblower Under
Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision: How and Why Public Policy Should Guide the
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b. Protecting Only External Whistleblowers
Forces Corporate Counsel to Act Irrationally
A broad interpretation of section 922 may, at worst, diminish a company’s
discretion over its own compliance officers and internal auditors.251
However, a narrow interpretation creates a situation in which corporate
counsel cannot rationally comply with both Dodd-Frank and the other SEC
provisions specifically regulating securities companies’ attorneys.
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress explicitly required in-house counsel to
disclose illegal activity internally. In section 307, Sarbanes-Oxley requires
all attorneys “appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way”
to “report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company . . . to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company.”252 If the chief legal
counsel or executive officer then fails to adopt “appropriate remedial
measures,” the attorney may report directly to a compliance committee of the
board of directors.253 If the attorney suffers discharge, demotion, suspension,
threat, harassment, or discrimination because of her report, section 806
provides protection and affords the attorney the right to back pay, with
interest, special damages, and reinstatement at the same seniority status that
she would have had, but for the discrimination.254
In addition to this congressional requirement that attorneys report
violations to their own companies, the SEC has requirements for when
attorneys are permitted to report violations to the SEC. The SEC
promulgated 17 C.F.R. § 205 (“Rule 205”) pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley.255
Rule 205 permits in-house counsel to report certain confidential information
to the SEC in violation of the traditional attorney-client privilege.256
However, under Rule 205, the attorney must first report to the corporation’s
chief counsel, who must “in turn report up the corporate ladder.”257 Then,
only if such internal mechanisms fail to produce compliance, the attorney
may report confidential information to the SEC.258 This general protocol is
often referred to as an “up, then out” reporting procedure.259
Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC’s rules promulgated thereunder,
corporate counsel is obligated to report “up, then out” and only by reporting
Courts in Finding That Whistleblowers Do Not Need to Report to the SEC, 10 FLA. INT’L U.
L. REV. 279, 315 (2014) (concluding that an internal protection model allows companies to
“remedy violations . . . before they become a larger problem”).
251. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
252. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012).
253. Id.
254. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2).
255. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2016).
256. Id.
257. Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3378. For general information on attorney reporting
requirements, see LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, ATTORNEYS AS SEC WHISTLEBLOWERS: CAN AN
ATTORNEY BLOW THE WHISTLE ON A CLIENT AND GET A MONETARY AWARD? (2013),
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/8CL6-M8QN].
258. Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3378.
259. Id. at 3390.
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in this way will the attorney receive protection against retaliatory firing.260
However, with external-only protection under Dodd-Frank, attorneys acting
in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 205 may be without recourse
under the Dodd-Frank Act.261
C. Dodd-Frank and Related Statues Protect,
but Distinguish, Internal Whistleblowers
For the purposes of retaliation protection, the Second and Fifth Circuit
Courts and the WARN Act only distinguish whistleblowers based on whether
their report is internal or external. Other systems within the SEC also
distinguish between whistleblowers on these grounds. However, SEC rules
and related whistleblower protection regimes go one step further to
distinguish between different types of internal whistleblowers.
1. Related Whistleblower Regimes
Whistleblower protections in closely related corporate regulations, such as
the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, Dodd-Frank’s Consumer
Financial Protection Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley, may shed light on better
solutions to Dodd-Frank’s internal-external whistleblower conundrum.
a. The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act262 (“the
Stimulus”) alongside Dodd-Frank in response to the 2008 financial crisis.263
The Stimulus was passed to provide funds for state and local governments in
an effort to stimulate the economy and mitigate the damage done by the
recession on a localized level.264 Like Dodd-Frank, it contains broad
whistleblower protections.265 However, in less uncertain terms than DoddFrank, the Stimulus provides whistleblower protection for any nonfederal
employees of employers “receiv[ing] stimulus funds”266 who make a
protected disclosure to a variety of state and federal enforcement and
regulatory agents or “a person with supervisory authority over the employee
(or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”267 This language is,
260. See id. at 3380 n.401 (“Under [Sarbanes-Oxley] and Part 205, attorneys are first
required to report misconduct internally, whereas the Fifth Circuit ruling requires attorneys to
report to the SEC in order to be afforded whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank.”).
261. Id. at 3380–81; see also Keen, supra note 170, at 230 (“It does not make sense that
Congress and the SEC would intend to incentivize reporting yet leave employees in situations
where ‘individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to be granted protection.’” (quoting
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2013))).
262. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
263. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 155–56.
264. Id.
265. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1553, 123 Stat. at 297.
266. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 156. This includes employees of organizations that receive
the stimulus funds, are paid by the stimulus funds, and state and local governments. Id.
267. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1553, 123 Stat. at 297.
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perhaps not surprisingly, identical to the language used in Sarbanes-Oxley’s
whistleblower protection statute.268 Applying the Stimulus’s structure to the
present issue would suggest the SEC should protect internal whistleblowers
under Dodd-Frank.
b. The Consumer Financial Protection Act
While the Stimulus was not part of Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank provides
other potentially informative whistleblower protections outside section 922.
Interestingly, the “longest lasting legacy” of Dodd-Frank may not be its many
complex regulations of banks and securities companies but rather its
establishment of the CFPB.269 In creating the CFPB, Dodd-Frank afforded
the bureau its own whistleblower protections.270 These include protections
for employees who report potential violations to the CFPB or to their
employer.271
As discussed above, the explicit protections for internal whistleblowers in
the CFPB provisions likely weigh against an interpretation that reads similar
implicit provisions into the SEC’s protections.272 However, the same CFPB
whistleblower provisions may suggest how to more effectively craft a better
rule on section 922. Alternatively, it may suggest to courts how to interpret
section 922, or it may instruct Congress on how to effectively craft a revised
version of section 922. Because the CFPB provides general protection for
internal whistleblowers, if the SEC applies the CFPB’s whistleblower
structure to the present issue, it should similarly protect internal
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.
c. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
This Note has made clear that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections
integrate Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections and, in doing so, have
caused much confusion about internal and external whistleblowers under
Dodd-Frank. However, this explicit interconnection between the two acts
gives the SEC and lawmakers all the more reason to look to Sarbanes-Oxley
as they search for an effective way to delineate between and among external
and internal whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank. As described above,
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates and incentivizes companies to establish and
maintain internal monitoring controls.273 These controls include establishing
internal whistleblowing channels274 and protecting internal whistleblowers
268. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012) (“[W]hen the information or assistance is
provided to . . . a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct) . . . .”).
269. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557, 557 (2013).
270. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part III.A.4.
274. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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against retaliation.275 Even if Sarbanes-Oxley confuses Dodd-Frank as an
interpretive matter, it may inform Dodd-Frank as a matter of policy.
Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection for internal whistleblowers, and, as a
policy prescription, it would encourage Dodd-Frank to do the same.
Importantly, in looking at all the other federal whistleblower protections
within the U.S. Code, neither the Second Circuit’s interpretation, protecting
all internal whistleblowers, nor the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, protecting
only external whistleblowers, holds a majority within the whole code.276
Applying the related statutes mentioned above would suggest that internal
whistleblowers should be protected, but the whole code does not suggest
consensus.
2. Existing SEC Structures That Recognize a Difference
Among Internal Whistleblowers
Corporate securities auditors and attorneys must follow existing SEC
procedures to report wrongdoing to the SEC.277 Under these rules, auditors
and attorneys are not allowed to report wrongdoing to the SEC until they
have already done so to their employer.278 Under the Securities Exchange
275. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
276. The word “whistleblower” is used throughout the U.S. Code. Many of these statutes
have made a distinction between internal and external whistleblowers. See Tax Relief and
Healthcare Act of 2006, 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012) (providing awards to whistleblowers
who externally report violations of the internal revenue code when such reports result in an
enforcement action); Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, 31 U.S.C. § 5328
(providing protection for external whistleblower brokers and whistleblower dealers who
provide information to “the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, or any Federal
supervisory agency” in furtherance of the act); VA Patient Protection Act of 2016, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 731–32 (allowing internal veterans’ benefits whistleblowers to file a “whistleblower
complaint” with the “immediate supervisor of the employee” and protecting such
whistleblowers against adverse employment actions); Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 2902, 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (prohibiting an employer from retaliating against an internal whistleblower
because the employee “notified his employer of an alleged violation of this chapter or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954”); Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 30172 (adopting the “Motor Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act,” which provides a reward
for an automobile industry whistleblower unless the reported organization has an internal
reporting mechanism that the whistleblower failed to use); Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (prohibiting any “air
carrier” from retaliating against any internal or external whistleblower); National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 3164, 50 U.S.C. § 2702 (protecting internal
whistleblowers within the Department of Energy’s defense activities who report a violation
to, among others, the Inspector General of the Department of Energy). This is not an
exhaustive list of the relevant whistleblower protections within the U.S. Code, because
Congress may protect whistleblowers without explicitly stating so. One example is the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1790b(a)(1). Congress initially titled a subsection of the act “Prohibition against
discrimination against whistleblowers” but later changed the section title to “In general.” See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
§ 251(b)(1), 105 Stat. 2236, 2331–32. Congress left untouched the substance of the law, which
never uses the word “whistleblower” but prohibits insured credit unions from discriminating
against employees who blow the whistle by externally reporting potential violations to certain
relevant authorities. See 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a).
277. See supra Part III.B.4.b.
278. See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
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Act, auditors of a public company are required to “inform the appropriate
level of the management” of illegal acts unless those acts are
inconsequential.279 If management fails to take appropriate remedial action,
auditors are required to report to the corporation’s board of directors.280 An
auditor may only report illegal acts to the Commission if management or the
board fails to take appropriate remedial action.281
Under the SEC’s “standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers,” attorneys are required to report material violations
of securities laws to the corporation’s chief legal counsel or CEO.282 If
neither the corporation’s legal counsel nor CEO take appropriate remedial
action, the attorney is required to report the violation to the audit or other
appropriate committee of the board of directors.283 Rule 3 of the SEC’s
standards of professional conduct “contemplates an attorney reporting to the
Commission only after internal reporting.”284 Because of these requirements
imposed on auditors and attorneys, “any retaliation would almost always
precede Commission reporting.”285 Therefore, it is unlikely that either would
gain protection under Dodd-Frank if the act only protects reports made to the
Commission.286
Similarly, when the SEC interpreted Dodd-Frank’s bounty provisions, it
delineated along similar lines those corporate personnel who usually would
not be eligible for whistleblowing awards.287 The SEC made this distinction
by defining the criteria for original information.288 Such employees usually
include corporate officers and directors who have learned of the violation in
connection with the company’s compliance processes,289 internal and
279. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B).
280. Id. § 78j-1(b)(2).
281. Id. § 78j-1(b)(3).
282. Id. § 7245.
283. Id. § 7245(2).
284. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 801 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(d)(2) (2016)).
285. Id. at 151.
286. Id. at 152. However, this has not prevented attorneys from trying. In Danon v.
Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. 15-6864, 2016 WL 2988987 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2016), an
“experienced tax attorney” sued his former employer, Vanguard, under whistleblower
protection claims. Id. at *1.
287. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,317
(June 13, 2011) (“[W]e have identified by title or function specific categories of personnel to
whom the rules apply.”).
288. Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A)–(C) describe “three categories of persons” whom the SEC
“will not treat as having ‘independent knowledge’ . . . for purposes of a whistleblower
submission . . . .” Id. “Independent knowledge” is required to qualify for a whistleblowing
award. See supra Part II.A.2.
289. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A). However, the rule does not preclude officers
from obtaining an award “in all circumstances.” See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,318–19 (clarifying the exceptions to 17 C.F.R. 240.21F4(b)(iii)). The rule also clarifies in subsection (vi) that the bar will extend to the recipients of
an officer’s information such as her assistant. Id. at 34,321. However, this rule has not kept
corporate officers from trying to receive protection. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc.,
No. 14-C-352, 2016 WL 4507317, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2016) (noting that the
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contracted employees who are responsible for internal compliance,290 anyone
who learns information through a communication subject to attorney-client
privilege,291 and nearly all other persons retained to perform internal
investigations or inquiries into possible violations of the law.292 In doing so,
the SEC aimed to prevent individuals from using a whistleblower submission
in a way that “might undermine the proper operation of internal compliance
Therefore, these personnel who provide nonoriginal
systems.”293
information make up the group of internal whistleblowers who likely would
never receive protection from Dodd-Frank in an external-only
interpretation.294 But they also make up the group of internal whistleblowers
who cannot be granted full protection without frustrating the goals of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.295
IV. WHETHER, WHICH, AND HOW INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS
SHOULD BE PROTECTED
As of yet, courts, politicians, and scholars alike have recognized only three
possible solutions to the present circuit split: (1) either the statute should be
interpreted as ambiguous and courts should defer to the SEC’s interpretation
protecting all internal whistleblowers,296 (2) the statute should be interpreted
as unambiguous and courts should protect only those external whistleblowers
who report directly to the SEC,297 or (3) Congress should enact legislation
adopting the SEC’s interpretation and adding more protections to additional
classes of whistleblowers.298
The solutions presented by the SEC, the Second and Fifth Circuits, and the
WARN Act all fail to overcome insurmountable interpretive flaws.299
Additionally, each presents policy challenges that betray the original
purposes behind Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank because they provide all-

plaintiff’s compliant arises out of “his termination from the position of CEO of Defendant
Orion Energy Systems”), appeal filed, No. 16-3502 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2016).
290. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B)–(C); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,318 (including “employees whose principle duties involve
compliance or internal audit responsibilities, as well as employees of outside firms that are
retained to perform compliance or internal audit work for an entity”).
291. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)–(ii). The SEC “inten[ded] that all attorneys—whether
specifically retained or working in-house—are eligible for awards only to the extent that their
disclosures to [the SEC] are consistent with their ethical obligations and . . . Rule 205.3.”
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,315; see supra notes
282–84 and accompanying text. Prohibiting the use of attorney-client privileged information
for whistleblowing rewards “send[s] a clear, important signal . . . that there will be no prospect
of financial benefit for submitting information in violation of an attorney’s ethical
obligations.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,315.
292. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(C)–(D).
293. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,317.
294. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.A.4.
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See supra Part III.B.
298. See supra Part III.A.5.
299. See supra Part III.A.5, B.2, B.3.
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However,
or-nothing protections for internal whistleblowers.300
whistleblower regulations under the Securities Exchange Act, the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, and
Sarbanes-Oxley suggest not only that internal whistleblowers should be
protected but that certain internal whistleblowers should be protected
differently.301
This Note proposes the following solution: (1) when an employer
terminates an external whistleblower, the employer should bear the burden
of proving that the termination was not retaliatory; (2) when an employer
terminates an internal whistleblower who has provided original information,
the employer should bear the burden of proving that the termination was not
retaliatory; and (3) when an employer terminates an internal whistleblower
who has provided nonoriginal information, the internal whistleblower should
bear the burden of proving that the termination was retaliatory.302
As demonstrated above, the Sarbanes-Oxley integration within DoddFrank makes section 922 sufficiently ambiguous to warrant deference to the
SEC’s interpretation.303 The reasoning behind the SEC’s interpretation,
however, is internally inconsistent and runs counter to the goals motivating
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.304
The case for external whistleblowers is unequivocal and their protection is
undisputed. Whether the information provided is “original” or not, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) protects a whistleblower who provides “information” to
the SEC.305 For this reason, external whistleblowers are explicitly granted
protection under the act and the burden of proof should remain with their
employers to demonstrate a nonretaliatory justification for terminating such
a whistleblower.
However, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), where Dodd-Frank integrates
Sarbanes-Oxley, says nothing about the type of information that earns
protection.306 While Sarbanes-Oxley protects a whistleblower who provides
“information” to “a person with supervisory authority over the employee,”307
it never distinguishes between information and original information in the
way Dodd-Frank does.308
In 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4, the SEC distinguishes between information and
original information for the purposes of whistleblower rewards in an effort to
prevent individuals from using whistleblowing in a way that circumvents the

300. See supra Part III.A.4, A.5, B.4.
301. See supra Part III.C.
302. For readability, this Note uses the word “terminate,” but under Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank, “terminate” is treated as equivalent to “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass . . . or in any other manner discriminate against [a whistleblower].” See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
303. See supra Part III.A.1–3.
304. Compare supra Part III.A.2–3, with Part III.C.1.
305. See supra Part II.A.3.
306. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
307. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
308. Compare supra Part II.A.2, with supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.309 However, protection against
termination is a reward in itself.310 Without similarly distinguishing in the
case of whistleblower protections, the SEC’s rule may still allow certain
internal whistleblower reports to circumvent the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank.311
Therefore, based on the motives guiding Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank,312 and the related structures mentioned above,313 the best
interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s internal whistleblower
protections must treat those who provide original information differently
from those who provide nonoriginal information.
Whether as a matter of judicial interpretation, administrative rulemaking,
or legislative lawmaking, internal whistleblowers who provide original
information should bear no burden to demonstrate that their termination was
retaliatory. Internal whistleblowers who do not provide original information
should bear the burden of proving that their termination was in retaliation for
their internal whistleblower report. Treating these types of internal
whistleblowers differently is an interpretation guided by related
whistleblower regimes,314 reflects the existing structures within the SEC,315
and more effectively accomplishes the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank by balancing necessary whistleblower protections316 with the
deference corporations need to manage effective internal compliance
systems.317

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173–82 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Parts I.C, III.A.4.

